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CROSSROADS FOR FEDERAL
ENFORCEMENT OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT
JOYCE M. MARTIN*
A major goal of the Clean Air Act' (hereinafter CAA or "Act")
is to "protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's air resources."2
The Act uses a two tiered approach to accomplish this goal. First, the
Act focuses on the national attainment and maintenance of National
Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for "criteria" pollutants,3
and second, the Act also sets specific standards for known hazardous
air pollutants (HAPS)4. The Act emphasizes throughout its text that
air quality problems are national in scope and often cross state bound-
aries
* The author is Director of the Office of Legal Counsel, Indiana Department of
Environmental Management (IDEM) and teaches environmental law at the Indiana University
School of Law-Indianapolis. She was on temporary assignment with the Air Enforcement
Division, Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assistance, Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) in Washington, D.C. from July 1995-January 1996. The views expressed in this article
are those of the author and not of IDEM or EPA.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (1988).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7407-7409 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Criteria pollutants are defined as
pollutants that "endanger public health or welfare" and result "from numerous or diverse mobile
or stationary sources." 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1) (1988). The Clean Air Act required the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to set national ambient air quality standards
(NAAQS) for six identified pollutants: ozone, carbon monoxide, particulate matter (PM-10),
lead, sulfur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7407-7409 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
4. Hazardous air pollutants (HAPs) (also called "toxic air pollutants" or "air toxics") can
cause serious illness or death. The Clean Air Act required the EPA to establish national
emission standards within six (6) months for each pollutant the agency lists as a hazardous air
pollutant. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)(A)-(B) (1988).
5. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401(b)(1) (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 7470 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Both the
legislative history of the Clean Air Act of 1970 and the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990
reflect this understanding.
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Congress clearly intended that enforcement of programs to
improve air quality be a cooperative effort of state and federal
governments. 6 Courts also have recognized for decades the necessity
of a federal enforcement presence in the effort to improve air quality
nationally. As the D.C. Circuit Court noted,
EPA... is the ultimate supervisor, responsible for approving state
plans and for stepping in, should a state fail to develop or to
enforce an acceptable plan. ... EPA is to ensure national
uniformity where needed, for example, to ensure that states do not
compete unfairly for industry by offering air quality standards that
are too lax to bring about needed improvement in the air we
breathe.7
An important component of many federal environmental laws is
federal enforceability. The federal enforceability' of state air quality
limitations or controls on sources requires that the Administrator of
the EPA, not solely state or local authorities, enforce emission
requirements. Citizens also have the right to enforce federally
enforceable provisions under the Act.9 To be considered federally
The Clean Air Act ... recognizes that primary responsibility for control of air
pollution rests with State and local government.... If the Secretary should find that
a State or local air pollution control agency is not acting to abate violations of
implementation plans or to enforce certification requirements, he would be
expected to use the full force of Federal law. Also, the Secretary should apply the
penalty provisions of this section to the maximum extent necessary ....
S. Rep. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1970). "Air pollution recognizes no State or
international borders. Aggressive controls in down-wind areas will do little to improve air quality
if the quality of air entering the region is poor." S. Rep. No. 228, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1989),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3389.
6. S. Rep. No. 228, supra note 5, at 3, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3389.
7. Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 698 F.2d 456,471 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
8. The term "federally enforceable" is defined at three (3) places in the Federal Register.
The definitions are identical:
Federally enforceable means all limitations and conditions which are enforceable by the
Administrator, including those requirements developed pursuant to 40 C.F.R. parts 60
and 61, requirements within any applicable State implementation plan, any permit
requirements established pursuant to 40 C.F.R. 52.21 or under regulations approved
pursuant to 40 C.F.R. part 51, subpart I, including operating permits issued under an
EPA-approved program that is incorporated into the State implementation plan and
expressly requires adherence to any permit issued under such program.
40 C.F.R.§§ 51.165(a)(1)(xiv), 51.166(b)(17), 52.21(b)(17) (1995).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). While state law may provide authority for
citizens to enforce environmental provisions, many do not provide incentives for citizens to
pursue enforcement. See, eg., IND. CODE ANN. § 13-6-1 (Burns 1990 & Supp. 1995)
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enforceable, a permitting program must first be approved by the EPA
as part of a State Implementation Plan (SIP) and include provisions
for public participation. A federally enforceable requirement muist
have gone through a public participation process and must be
enforceable as both as practical matter and as a legal matter." The
factors that comprise practicable enforceability are: specific applicabil-
ity; reporting or notice to the permitting authority; specific technically
accurate limits; specific compliance monitoring; practicably enforce-
able averaging times and clearly recognized enforcement." The
practical enforceability requirement ensures that limitations and
controls are of sufficient quality and quantity to ensure accountability,
i.e., that federal authorities have the data and resources necessary to
take enforcement action. 2 "Legal enforceability," on the other
hand, means that the federal authorities have both the jurisdiction and
the statutory or regulatory authority necessary to take enforcement
actions. Federal enforceability is a provision of longstanding impor-
tance in the air regulatory system.
The structure of the Act also reveals the legislative intent of
Congress to prevent a "rush to the bottom" where states compete for
industry by offering lower environmental controls than those of their
neighbors." Federal enforceability of nationally applicable minimum
(authorizing citizen suits, but not providing attorney fees for citizens who bring a citizen suit and
prevail).
10. Memorandum from Michael S. Alushin, Associate Enforcement Counsel for Air
Enforcement; Alan W. Eckert, Associate General Counsel for Air Enforcement; John Seitz,
Director, Stationary Source Compliance Division, Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards,
to Regional Administrators, Regions I-X et al. 1-2 (September 23, 1987) (on file with the Duke
Environmental Law and Policy Forum).
11. Specific applicability means that the rule or permit designed to limit potential to emit
must clearly identify the categories of sources that qualify for the rule's coverage. Reporting
or notice to permitting authority indicates that the permittee should be required to provide
specific reporting and monitoring information to the permitting authority. Scientific technically
accurate limits are those that clearly specify the limits that apply, include the specific associated
compliance monitoring and identify any allowed deviations. Specific compliance monitoring
means that any rule concerning monitoring must state the monitoring requirements,
recordkeeping requirements and test methods as well as clarify which methods are approriate
for making a direct determination of compliance with potential to emit limitations. Memoran-
dum from Kathie A. Stein, Director, Air Enforcement Division, to Director, Air, Pesticides &
Toxics Management Division, Regions I & IV et al. 5 (January 25, 1995) (on file with the Duke
Environmental Law and Policy Forum). See also S. Rep. No,. 228 supra note 5, at 195, 355,
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3580, 3738.
12. See 54 Fed. Reg. 27,274 (1989). See also Stein, supra note 11 (memorandum at 2).
13. The legislative history of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95,
confirms that Congress intended for requirements to set a minimum standard to be met by all
states to reduce economic competition between the states. H.R.Rep. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st
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standards also reduces the chance that industry will move from states
that are actively controlling pollution to those with more relaxed
standards. Section 113 of the Act expressly provides authority for
federal enforcement of certain state requirements.14
Recent appellate cases15 and congressional bills and proposals
suggest that this important tool, federal enforceability, may be at risk.
While all federal enforcement has not been challenged, the federal
enforcement controls that limit emissions of a source below major
thresholds is a current target of regulated industry. Any limitation on
federal enforceability in that context could lead to even greiter
restrictions on federal enforceability in the future. 6
This article argues that federal enforceability of the limits and
controls which allow sources to avoid "major source" status has been
critical to both achieving the legislative purposes 7 of the Act and to
maintaining and improving air quality and should be preserved."8
Part I explains the history and purposes of federal enforceability, as
well as discussing the major programs affected by it. Part II describes
the areas in which challenges to federal enforceability have recently
occurred. Part IH offers several possible agency reactions in response
to court decisions on federal enforceability that would retain the
benefits of federal enforceability while creating more flexibility for
states and industries in the implementation of several important air
programs.
Sess. 140 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1219.
14.
The Administrator shall ... in the case of any person that is the owner or
operator of an affected source, a major emitting facility, or a major stationary
source, and may, in the case of any other person, commence a civil action for a
permanent or temporary injunction, or to assess and recover a civil penalty of not
more than $25,000 per day for each violation, or both ....
42 U.S.C. § 7413(b)'(Supp. V 1993).
15. See infra notes 21-44 and 77-98 and accompanying text.
16. E.g., the title V operating permit program will be an all encompassing permit program
and, as currently structured, requires that permits contain federally enforceable requirements.
See infra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
17. See 54 Fed. Reg. 27,274 (1989).
18. See infra notes 29-55 and accompanying text.
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I. BACKGROUND: FEDERAL ENFORCEABILITY
A. Programs in which Federal Enforceability Exists
Federal enforceability of controls allows a source to avoid "major
source" status. This currently exists in three (3) important air
programs:
1. In the hazardous air pollutant (HAP) program,19 the calculation
of a source's effective controls in limiting its "potential to emit"
20
(PTE) for purposes of determining if it is a "major source, 21
2. In the new source review (NSR) program in nonattainment 2
areas and the prevention of significant deterioration (PSD)23
program in attainment areas, the calculation of a source's effective
19. 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (Supp. V 1993). Under the CAA, "major sources" of hazardous air
pollutants (HAPs) are potentially subject to stricter regulatory control than are "area sources."
The term "major source" means any stationary source or group of stationary sources located
within a contiguous area and under common control that emits or has the potential to emit
considering controls, in the aggregate, ten (10) tons per year or more of any HAP or twenty-five
(25) tons per year or more of any combination of HAPs. The Administrator (of the EPA) may
establish a lesser quantity ... for a major source ... on the basis of the potency of the air
pollutant, persistence, potential for bioaccumulation, other characteristics of the air pbllutant,
or other relevant factors. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1) (Supp V 1993). An "area source" is "any
stationary source ... that is not a major source," and does not include "motor vehicles or
nonroad vehicles subject to regtulation under [42 U.S.C. §§ 7521-7590]." 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(2)
(Supp. V 1993).
20. "Potential to emit" means the maximum capacity of a stationary source to emit a
pollutant under its physical and operational design. Any physical or operational limitation on
the capacity of the source to emit a pollutant, including air pollution control equipment and
restrictions on hours of operation or on the type or amount of material combusted, stored, or
processed, shall be treated as part of its design only if the limitation or the effect it would have
on emissions is FEDERALLY ENFORCEABLE. Secondary emissions do not count in determining
the potential to emit of a stationary source. 40 C.F.R. §§ 51.165(a)(1)(iii), 51.166(b)(4), and
52.21(4) (1995) (emphasis added).
21. Major sources are those sources whose emissions of air pollutants exceed threshold
emission levels specified in the Act. Memorandum from John Seitz, Director, Office of Air
Quality Planning and Standards and Robert Van Heuvelen, Director, Office of Regulatory
Enforcement, to Director, Air, Pesticides and Toxics, Management Division, Regions I and IV
et al. 1 (January 25, 1995) (on file wvith the Duke Environmental Law and Policy Forum). For
the regulatory definitions of "major source," see infra note 36.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 7503 (1988 & Supp. V 1993): Areas that are designated as nonattainment
for a national ambient air quality standard (NAAQS) must meet certain requirements aimed at
achieving the NAAQS in those areas. See 40 C.F.R. § 51.165(a) (formerly 40 C.F.R. §§ 51.180)
and 52.24) (1995). The new source review program refers to permitting programs for new or
modified sources in attainment and nonattainment areas.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 7475 (1988). The PSD program refers to requirements that must be met
in an area designated as being in attainment of a NAAQS or as unclassifiable. See 40 C.F.R.
§§ 51.166, 52.21 (1995).
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controls in limiting its PTE for purposes of determining if it is a
"major source;" and
3. In the Title V 4 operating permit program established by the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (hereinafter CAAA of 1990 or
"Amendments"),' the determination of "major source" status for
inclusion in the program.
Industry groups who opposed federal enforceability challenged
the final agency rules implementing the first two programs in the
District of Columbia (D.C.) Circuit Court of Appeals. The court
reached decisions in both cases in the summer of 1995.26 The cases
are discussed in -detail in Part II of this Article. Additionally, the
federal enforceability of some Title V permit conditions have been
challenged by riders inserted by a House Subcommittee on the EPA's
appropriations bill and in other congressional bills. As part of a
broader litigation over rules implementing the Title V operating
permit program,' the legality of requiring federal enforceability of
terms, conditions and limits of Title V permits has been raised.'
B. History of Federal Enforceability in the Clean Air Act
The CAA establishes state implementation of air quality
improvement programs with federal oversight of those programs. The
primary mechanism for ensuring the integrity of this structure is the
State Implementation Plan (SIP) through which each state is required
24. 42 U.S.C. § 7661-7661f (Supp. V 1993). Not all terms and conditions in a state or
locally-issued title V permit are federally enforceable, (states may include state-only terms and
conditions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 7661e(a) (Supp. V 1993)). Only those terms and conditions
that are listed in the permit as federal applicable requirements are federally enforceable.
However, many of the critical requirements are federal and, therefore, federally enforceable.
See 42 U.S.C. §8 7661(2), 7661a(a), and 7661c(a) (Supp. V 1993).
The'legislative history of the CAAA of 1990 states that "[o]perating permits are needed to:
(1) better enforce the requirements of the law by applying them more clearly to individual
sources and allowing better tracking of compliance, and (2) provide an expedited process for
implementing new control devices." S. Rep. No. 228, supra note 5, at 346, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3729.
25. CAAA of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2339 (codified as amended 42 U.S.C
§ 7429-7671q (Supp. V 1993)). The Amendments were signed into law by President Bush on
November 15, 1990.
26. Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n. v. EPA, 70 F.3d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (consolidated cases Nos.
89-1514 to 89-1516) (CMA); National Mining Ass'n. v. E.P.A., 59 F.3d 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(National Mining).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 7661-7661f (Supp. V 1993).
28. Clean Air Act Implementation Project v. EPA, No. 92-1303 (and consolidated cases)
(D.C. Cir. 1995).
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to develop a specific plan for accomplishing the Act's air quality goals
within its borders.2 9 In effect, the SIP dictates how the NAAQS are
to be achieved in a particular state. The Act requires the SIP to
establish control strategies for reducing emissions and to demonstrate
that the measures proposed would actually achieve NAAQS ° A
SIP must be approved by the EPA prior to its enactment, and the
EPA retains an active role in revisions to the SIP.
Since the CAA was enacted in 1970, federal enforceability of
limits, controls, and conditions has been widely accepted by states and
regulated industries. If a pollution source wanted to avoid "major
source" status by limiting its potential to emit to "minor" levels, those
self-imposed controls or limitations had to be federally enforceable.
However, EPA regulations, rather than the Clean Air Act itself,
impose the requirement of federal enforceability. For example, the
regulations state that: "[a] source may generally be credited with
emissions reductions achieved by shutting down an existing source or
permanently curtailing production or operating hours below baseline
levels ... , if such reductions are permanent, quantifiable and
federally enforceable ... ." (emphasis added). 31
In August 1980, however, the EPA extensively revised its regula-
tions concerning preconstruction review of new and modified sources
in response to the D.C. Circuit case, Alabama Power Company v.
Costle.2 Plaintiffs challenged, among other items, the EPA's plan
to calculate potential to emit without considering controls installed on
sources. In Alabama Power, the court held that the EPA's calculation
had to consider such controls.33
29. "Each state shall... adopt and submit to the Administrator,... a plan which provides
for implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of such primary standard in each air quality
control region (or portion thereof) within such State." 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1) (Supp. V 1993).
For a further explanation of State Implementation Plans, see Stein, supra note 11
(memorandum at 5).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1) (Supp. V 1993).
31. 40 C.F.R. Pt. 51, App. S (IV)(a)(3)(i) (1995).
32. 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
33. Id. at 355. See also 45 Fed. Reg. 52,676 (1980) for the five (5) sets of regulations that
resulted from those revisions:
(1) 40 C.F.R. §§ 51.165 (a) and (b) (formerly 40 C.F.R. §§ 51.18G) and (k)) specify the
elements of an approvable state permit program for preconstruction review in, or
affecting, a nonattainment area;
(2) 40 C.F.R. § 51.166 (formerly 40 C.F.R. § 51.24) specifies the minimum require-
ments that a PSD program must contain to warrant approval by the EPA as a
revision to a SIP under section 110 of the Act;
1996]
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In the fall of 1980, numerous organizations petitioned the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals for review of various provisions of the NSR
regulations. 4 the EPA entered into a settlement of the case and the
court subsequently entered a judicial stay, pending implementation of
the settlement agreement.
As part of the settlement, the EPA agreed to propose certaifi
amendments to eight parts of the regulations pertaining to NSR, to
provide guidance in three additional areas, and to take final action on
the proposals." On August 25, 1983, the EPA published a notice of
proposed rulemaking in accordance with that agreement.36 The EPA
proposed deleting from certain provisions37 the requirement that
controls or limitations on a source's emissions must be "federally
enforceable" to be considered in determining whether a new or
modified source would be "major ''38 and, therefore, subject to NSR
(3) 40 C.F.R., Pt. 51, App. S, specifies the nonattainment area emissions offset
interpretive ruling;
(4) 40 C.F.R. § 52.21 establishes the federal PSD program; and
(5) 40 C.F.R. § 52.54 sets out the construction moratorium that applies in certain
nonattainment areas.
34. Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n. v. EPA, 70 F.3d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (consolidated cases Nos.
89-1514 to 89-1516).
35. The settlement of CMA is discussed in the preamble to the EPA's final rules on HAPS
54 Fed. Reg. 27,274, 27,274 (1989). The final settlement agreement was entered into on
February 22, 1982.
36. 48 Fed. Reg. 38,742 (August 25, 1983).
37. The provisions were five sets of PSD and nonattainment regulations at 40 C.F.R.
§§ 51.24, 52.21, App. S, Pt. 51, 51.18(j), and 52.24 that defined "major stationary source" as any
source that would have the potential to emit certain amounts of air pollution, e.g., 40 C.F.R.
§ 52.21(b)(1). Each provision of the regulations defined "-potential to emit" as "the maximum
capacity of a stationary source to emit a pollutant under its physical and operational design."
See, eg., 40 C.F.R. 52.21(b)(4). However, these controls would only limit potential to emit if
the limitation is federally enforceable. See, eg., 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(4).
38. "Major source" is defined differently for hazardous air pollutants and criteria pollutants.
Hazardous air pollutants:
The term "major source' means any stationary source or group of stationary sources
located within a contiguous area and under common control that emits or has the
potential to emit considering controls, in the aggregate, 10 tons per year or more of any
hazardous air pollutant or 25 tons or more per year of any combination of hazardous
air pollutants.
42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1) (Supp. V 1993).
Criteria pollutants:
"[M]ajor stationary source" and "major emitting facility" mean any stationary facility
or source of air pollutants which directly emits, or has the potential to emit, one
hundred tons per year or more of any air pollutant ....
[Vol. 6:77
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requirements. 9 The proposed rule was subject to comments by all
interested parties.
After receiving comments, on June 28, 1989, the EPA published
a final rule on that part of the August 25, 1983 proposal dealing with
"federal enforceability" of emission controls and limitations.'0 In
this 1989 rulemaking, the EPA retained the existing federal enforce-
ability requirement and merely clarified its regulation to specify the
situations in which provisions of a state operating permit program
would be treated as federally enforceable.4' A rationale for federal
enforceability was provided in the preamble to the June 28, 1989
Federal Register notice. 2 The major arguments advanced in the
preamble in favor of retaining federal enforceability were that federal
enforceability ensured that: (1) limits accepted during applicability
determinations are really intended to be observed; (2) industries and
states operate on a "level playing field; (3) there is an effective
backstop to state enforcement efforts; (4) citizens are able to enforce
controls and limits; and (5) there are meaningful incentives for
compliance.43
The EPA was sued by various industry groups over the federal
enforceability provisions of these final rules in 1989." Before that
suit could be settled or resolved, Congress enacted the CAAA of
1990. Resolution of the CMA case was delayed by the court pending
implementation of the Amendments.
42 U.S.C. § 76026) (1988).
39. The EPA also proposed to delete a requirement that emissions reductions be obtained
by one (1) source from another (offsets) to obtain a nonattainment permit that was federally
enforceable. New emissions of a potential major source in a nonattainment area are required
to be offset by emission reductions elsewhere. 42 U.S.C. § 7503(c)(1) (Supp. V 1993).
40. 54 Fed. Reg. 27,274 (1989).
41. Id While the settlement agreement in the CMA case required that the EPA take
comment on the possible deletions of federal enforceability, final adoption of a rule must follow
the procedures of the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-551 (1994), and cannot
be dictated through a settlement. Comments are received on a proposed rule and the final rule
must be responsive to those comments. In this case, the EPA argued that comments received
required it to promulgate rules retaining federal enforceability. See Fed. Reg. 27,274, 27,277
(1989).
42. Id at 27,277-27,280. See infra pp. 10-15 and accompanying notes for a discussion of
the rationale of federal enforceability.
43. Id.
44. Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n. v. EPA, 70 F.3d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (consolidated cases Nos.
89-1514 to 89-1516) (CMA case).
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The CAAA of 1990 created an operating permit program
through Title V of the Act.45 The goal of the Title V permit
program was to assemble in one document, the operating permit,
virtually every standard, limitation, condition, or requirement
specifically applicable to a source. Federal enforceability of limits,
controls and conditions was incorporated as a basic component of the
Title V permit program.46
Construction permits for new or modified sources of HAPs will
be incorporated as part of the Title V operating permit program.47
In August 1993, the EPA proposed a rule establishing general proce-
dures for emission standards for all hazardous air pollutants.48 The
final "general provisions" rule was published on March 16, 1994.49
Both the proposed and the final rule indicated that federal enforce-
ability of controls on potential to emit would be required. Several
interested industry groups challenged this rule in a separate litiga-
tion.50
In a January 25, 1995 memorandum5' discussing various meth-
ods that states could make available to sources to limit their potential
to emit, the EPA expanded on the June 25, 1989 final rule pream-
ble.5' The memo clarified that for sources with the capability to emit
major amounts of pollutants but that wish to avoid major source
requirements by restricting this capability, federal enforceability
provided a credible system to ensure that sources adhere to those self-
imposed restrictions.53 In addition, the memo acknowledged several
viable ways of creating federally enforceable limitations on potential
to emit (e.g., federally enforceable state operating permits (FESOPS);
limitations established by rules; general permits; construction permits;
and title V permits).54 To qualify as federally enforceable, controls
were required to be practically effective and incorporated into the
45. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7661-7661f (Supp. V 1993).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(2) (Supp. V 1993).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 7661(a) (Supp. V 1993).
48. 58 Fed. Reg. 42,760 (1993).
49. 59 Fed. Reg. 12,408 (1994).
50. National Mining Ass'n. v. E.P.A., 59 F.3d 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
51. Memorandum from J. Seitz, R. Van Heuvelen, supra note 21.
52. 54 Fed. Reg. 27,274, supra note 12. See also memorandum from J. Seitz, supra note
12; memorandum from K. Stein, supra note 11. For a court discussion of federal enforceability,
see also United States v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 682 F. Supp. 1141 (D. Colo. 1988).
53. Memorandum from J. Seitz, R. Van Heuvelen, supra note 22.
54. Id.
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state implementation plan (SIP) in a manner that allowed for public
notice and comment, either generally (category-wide, such as a SIP
rule) or through source-specific requirements."
C. Rationale for Retention of Federal Enforceability
Although states have primary responsibility for controlling air
pollution, they need the support a credible federal enforcement
program offers in order to be most effective. In addition, federal
enforcement provides consistency to state control, as well as, a
minimum level of protection of a resource that cannot be confined
within one state's borders. Federal enforceability of state require-
ments, limits and controls serves important goals of the CAA:
1. Federal enforceability ensures that sources accurately determine
if they are "major sources." Federal enforceability is necessary to
ensure that limitations and reductions agreed to by sources in their
permits are actually implemented. Such limitations and reductions
cannot merely exist on paper but must be actually incorporated in the
source's design and followed in practice to have a positive impact on
air quality.
Major sources are tracked by the HAPs, NSR and Title V pro-
grams. "Natural minors, 56 are not regulatory targets under the three
programs as currently structured. EPA enforcement of controls on
pofential to emit is primarily aimed at so-called "synthetic minors"
(those NSR sources with potential to emit above major source thresh-
olds but whose controls allow the source to limit PTE and avoid
major source status) as well as at area sources (those sources of HAPs
with potential to emit above major source thresholds but whose
controls allow the source to limit PTE and avoid major source status).
The threat of enforcement action by federal authorities ensures that
controls assumed by synthetic minor and area sources to avoid major
source status are actually implemented. The EPA's ability to
accurately track the emissions of these sources so that air quality can
be maintained and improved is dependent on federal enforceability
of controls taken on by these sources to avoid major source status.57
55. ld.
56. Natural minors are those sources whose potential to emit as well as actual emissions fall
below major source thresholds.
57. 54 Fed. Reg. 27,274, 27,277 (1989):
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The integrity of a system that subjects major sources to stringent
requirements depends on some level of regulation of the controls on
synthetic minors and area sources regarding controls that keep them
below major source emission levels and therefore free from the
correspondingly stringent requirements.
2. Federal enforceability provides a level playing field for
industries and states and an important backstop to state and local en-
forcement efforts. To maintain air quality in attainment areas and
improve it in nonattainment areas, state and local limitations must be
effectively implemented. States vary in their ability and willingness
to impose effective controls on their state industries.5" As a result,
a source could avoid the federal requirements by merely receiving
state or local controls that the source does not intend to fully
implement and, in actuality, does not fully implement. 9
The EPA's preamble to the NSR final rule recognized this
problem and noted that:
Federal enforceability is necessary to support State and local
enforcement efforts. Although EPA believes that most State and
local governments are committed to effective enforcement of their
permit programs, it is true,.... that the level of State and local
enforcement is uneven, and that some States and localities have
been unwilling or unable to enforce their programs effectively...[I]n the absence of a Federal enforcement capability to backup
State and local efforts, there would be somewhat less incentive for
sources to actually observe non-Federal limitations .... 6o
As the state and local air directors' association noted in the June
28, 1989 Federal Register:
[A]bsent Federal enforcement capability, some State and local
governments would be more susceptible to economic and other
[I]t is essential to the integrity of the PSD and nonattainment program that such State
or local limitations be actually and effectively implemented... . Federal enforceability
is both necessary and appropriate to ensure that such limitations and reductions are
actually incorporated into a source's design and followed in practice.
58. Id.
59. The State and Territorial Air Pollution Program Administrators/Association of Local
Air Pollution Control Officials (STAPPA/ALAPCO) argued this very point in comments on the
proposed rule to eliminate federal enforceability. 54 Fed.Reg. 27,274, 27,276 (1989). See also
supra p. 10 and note 50.
60. 54 Fed. Reg. 27,274, 27,277 (1989).
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pressures from industry that could actually make State and local
enforcement less effective than it currently is.61
In United States v. City of Painesville,62 the court examined the
role of the federal government in the context of a challenge to the
lower court's holding that a Painesville boiler was a "new source
under the CAA." The court observed that:
The new source standards prevent industries from "shopping
around" for "pollution havens" that might otherwise exist if states
were allowed any flexibility in setting standards for new sources.
See 116 Cong. Rec. 32902 (remarks of Senator Muskie), reprinted
in Legislative History 227; Environmental Law Institute, Federal
Environmental Law 1104 (1974). Such shopping around is fore-
closed by the new source standard, because they set a nationwide
"floor" on the permissible level of pollution from new sources.63
Many states recognize the role politics plays in environmental
enforcement decisions and refer politically difficult cases to the EPA.
One example is Marine Shale, the nation's largest incinerator of
hazardous waste, who had operated for several years without air
permits (as well as without waste and water permits). In 1986, Marine
Shale applied to the State of Louisiana for a state operating permit.
Louisiana granted the permit with limits of 89 tons per year (tpy) for
carbon monoxide and 0.22 tons per year of nitrous oxide (NOx).
Marine Shale's actual emissions were 250 tpy for carbon monoxide
and over 1,000 tpy for NOx. The inability of the state to issue a
credible permit caused the EPA to use its federal enforceability power
to file an enforcement action in 1993. On August 30, 1995, the
Western District of Louisiana issued a decision awarding $3.5 million
in penalties for Clean Air Act violations. The court found that
Marine Shale was operating a major source of air emissions without
a PSD major source permit and that Marine Shale was operating
twenty-nine minor sources of air emissions without appropriate
Louisiana SIP minor permits.'
Similarly, Navistar International Transportation Corporation, an
Ohio truck manufacturer, violated allowable emission limitations for
61. Id,
62. 644 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981).
63. Id. at 1192.
64. United States v. Marine Shale Processors Inc., 1994 WL 279839 (W.D. La. 1994) appeal
docketed, No. 94-30664 (5th Cir. Aug. 15, 1995).
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volatile organic compounds (VOCs) under Ohio's SIP.6 During its
period of noncompliance, Navistar emitted an average of 640 tons of
VOCs per year, exceeding its allowable emissions by 350 tons per
year. Navistar was a major employer in Ohio and the State found it
difficult to take enforcement action against a major employer and
taxpayer of the state. Ohio referred the case to the EPA for enforce-
ment.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the EPA, finding
Navistar liable on all accounts.66 Navistar agreed to settle the case
for payment of $42,703,000 for past violations at its plants.
In cases involving federal enforceability actions against synthetic
minors, the EPA has successfully argued that the source was either in
violation of its minor source permit limits or was actually a major
source operating without a permit. However, the holdings of National
Mining67 and CMA6" would eliminate the first cause of action be-,
cause effective limitations imposed by state or local authorities would
no longer be enforceable by the EPA.
While these cases would not foreclose the EPA from bringing the
second cause of action (i.e., claiming that the source was actually a
major source operating without a major source permit), they could
make proving the claim more difficult. For the EPA to prevail on
this cause of action, the Agency would first have to show that the
source had a potential to emit above major source thresholds and
then would also have to prove that existing controls intended to bring
its PTE below that threshold were ineffective. This is much more
difficult in practice than showing that the source has exceeded a
federally-enforceable short term emissions limitation.
Restricting the EPA's ability to enforce to only situations where
the gource failed to obtain proper major source permits would also
have the undesirable effect of allowing more pollutants to be emitted.
Instead of being able to enforce limits on potential to emit, which are
generally short-term, measurable, and practically enforceable limits
(i.e., emissions allowed per day, hour, week or month), the EPA
would have to accumulate one year of emission data in order to prove
emissions were above major source thresholds. If the limits were
65. Lutz v. Navistar, 1994 WL 696244 (6th Cir. 1994).
66. Id.
67.- National Mining Ass'n. v. EPA, 59 F.3d 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
68. Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n. V. EPA, 70 F.3d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (consolidated cases Nos.
89-1514 to 89-1516).
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directly federally enforceable, in contrast, the EPA could take action
within weeks of finding the first period in which emissions exceeded
allowable amounts, and would have a greater likelihood of stopping
the excess emissions sooner.
Absent viable federal enforceability of controls, states would be
placed in the unenviable position of either enforcing limits against
economically powerful sources without a federal back-up or abdicating
their enforcement role in those situations.
3. Federal enforceability ensures that citizens will be able to
enforce controls and limits. Citizen enforceability is intrinsically tied
to federal enforceability and was seen by Congress as vitally impor-
tant to the success of the CAA.69 Section 304 of the CAA provides
the basic mechanism by which citizens can initiate suits under the
Act.7" It allows citizens to bring suit against any person who violates
any limitation under the Act or any order issued by the Administrator
or a State with respect to such limitation. Citizens can also bring suit
against any person who proposes to construct or does construct a
major new source without a PSD or nonattainment permit.71
However, while violations of federally enforceable permit limitations
are subject to citizen suits, violations of nonfederal limitations appear
not to be.72 State citizen suit statutes would provide an alternative
enforcement mechanism, but many states have failed to enact such
statutes and, other states that have citizen suit statutes may lack
provisions which provide meaningful incentives for citizens' bringing
such suits.'
4. The requirement that provisions be federally enforceable
provides meaningful incentives for compliance with CAA requirements.
Even where state and local controls are technically sound and
enforceable as a practical matter, there may not be sufficient incentive
69. See, e.g., S.Rep. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 21, 38 (September 17, 1970). ("[i]f the
Secretary and State and local agencies should fail in their responsibility, the public would be
guaranteed the right to seek vigorous enforcement action under the citizen suit provisions of
section 304," and "[c]itizens would be performing a public service and in such instances the
courts should award costs of litigation to such party.").
70. See supra note 9.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1) (Supp. V 1993).
72. 54 Fed. Reg. 27,274, 27,777 (1989).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1988 & Supp V 1993) (asserting that the lack of attorney fees
provision serves as a disincentive for initiating suits).
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for sources to comply with those controls absent federal enforceabili-
ty. The incentive to comply with controls requires an adequate
mechanism for assuring an effective enforcement presence.74 In the
past, limits enforceable by the EPA and citizens under the CAA have
been the mechanism for assuring an adequate enforcement presence
for all fifty states. The threat of enforcement by the EPA and'citizens
was seen as a better incentive for compliance than state enforcement
alone. If those incentives were no longer viable, other methods of
motivating sources to comply would have to be found or the statutes
and regulations would become "dead letters."
II. CURRENT CHALLENGES TO FEDERAL ENFORCEABILITY
It is important to note that current challenges to federal enforce-
ability, even if successful, do not mean that there will be no enforce-
ment of air statutes and regulations by the federal government. Even
if federal enforceability were removed from specific controls that
allow sources to avoid the requirements of major source status, the
EPA would still have a substantial role in enforcing federal require-
ments. The federal agency could:
(1) enforce against permitted minor or area sources that were
actually major sources by accumulating data to prove that the
sources were major sources without permits;'
(2) veto the state Title V permit into which the limits were
written;76 or
(3) withdraw approval of the state program that allowed the source
its minor source status.'
However, all these options are much more difficult for the EPA to
take than an enforcement action against the source directly for
violating its limits. Direct federal enforceability authority found in
other CAA provisions would also remain.
74. 54 Fed. Reg. 27,274, 27,283 (1989).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 7477 (1988).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b)(5)(F) (1988 Supp. V 1993).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 7660(i) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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A. Federal Enforceability in the HAPs Context
Section 112 of the Clean Air Act designates specific pollutants as
"hazardous air pollutants.""8 The original design of the 1970 Act
authorized the EPA to set nationally uniform emission standards for
HAPs at a level that would provide an "ample margin of safety" to
protect human health.79 Scientific difficulties resulted in the promul-
gation of only seven standards between 1970 and 1989: arsenic,
asbestos, benzene, beryllium, mercury, radionuclides and vinyl
chloride. In 1990 Congress revised section 112 to mandate standards
for 189 HAPs on a technology-based approach with the implementa-
tion of health-based standards for any remaining risk.8" The CAAA
of 1990 required the EPA to list all categories of major sources and
area sources for each of 189 hazardous air pollutants and to develop
a maximum achievable control technology (MACT) for all new and
existing sources within specific time frames. All categories and
subcategories must be regulated by November 15, 2000. If the EPA
fails to meet the deadlines, states will have to make case-by-case
determinations of what the federal standards would have been and
make independent decisions on those conclusions, often referred to
as the "MACT hammer" 1
As discussed in Part I(B), 2 the EPA proposed and recently
adopted "general provisions" applicable to future HAPs rules.83
Industry groups challenged the rules in National Mining,84 where
plaintiffs raised three (3) specific challenges to the EPA's general
provisions rule. The EPA actions being challenged were:
(1) that the EPA included emissions from all facilities on a
contiguous plant site under common control;
(2) that the EPA included fugitive emissions in calculating
aggregate source emissions; and
78. 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
79. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7412(b)(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Scientific difficulties resulted in the
promulgation of only seven standards between 1970 and 1989: arsenic, asbestos, benzene,
beryllium, mercury, radionuclides and vinyl chloride. In 1990 Congress revised section 112 to
mandate standards for 189 HAPs on a technology-based approach with the implementation of
health-based standards for any remaining risk. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1993).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f)(2)(A).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(e) (Supp. V 1993).
82. See supra text accompanying notes 44-46.
83. 58 Fed Reg. 42,760 (1993) (proposed rules); 59 Fed. Reg. 12,408 (1994) (final rules).
84. National Mining Ass'n. v. EPA, 59 F.3d 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
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(3) that the EPA required that controls on a source's potential to
emit must be federally enforceable to determine if a source is
major.
The EPA prevailed on the first two challenges. Regarding the
third challenge to federal enforceability, the court held against the
EPA on July 21, 1995.86 The court stated that the !'EPA has not
explained... how its refusal to consider limitations other than those
that are 'federally enforceable' serves the statute's directive to
'consider controls' when it results in a refusal to credit controls
imposed by a state or locality even if they are unquestionably effec-
tive."' The court was not persuaded by the EPA's justifications for
requiring federal enforceability, and granted the industry's appeal on
this issue.
The EPA maintained in its brief and at oral argument that
federal enforceability allowed the EPA to verify that a source's
claimed controls were working as they were supposed to, and that
federal enforceability provided the EPA with the means to ensure
that any operational restrictions intended to limit emissions were
actually implemented.88
The court was troubled that each of the regulatory methods
identified by the EPA for establishing that a permit limitation was
federally enforceable required conditions that went beyond evaluating
the effectiveness of the particular constraint in controlling emis-
sions." The court concluded that the language of §112(a) that states
that a source's potential to emit is limited through "considering
controls" that can be placed on the source, does not give the EPA the
authority to impose requirements that are not directly related to the
'specific goal of determining the le,el of effective control.90 Specifi-
cally, the court stated:
In doing so, EPA sacrifices a statutory objective in pursuit of ends
that ... have not been justified, either in terms of §112 or other
85. Id. at 1354-55.
86. id. at 1351.
87. Id. at 1364.
88. Brief for the EPA at 12-13, 18-23, National Mining Ass'n v. EPA, 59 F.3d 1351 (D.C.
Cir. 1995).
89. National Mining, 59 F.3d at 1363 (expressing problems with public notice of the
proposed permit limitations; approval by the EPA and inclusion in the SIP).
90. Id. at 1364.
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provisions of the Act. EPA has not explained why it is essential
that a control be included within a SIP.... If there is a closer fit
between the notion of 'federal enforceability' and § 112's concern
with crediting effective controls it is not evident on this record.9'
The court previously stated that "it is certainly permissible for
EPA to have refused to take into account ineffective controls. ....
But is it also open to EPA under the statute to refuse to consider
controls on grounds other than their lack of effectiveness? 92
The court answered its own rhetorical question in the negative
and concluded that the "EPA has not explained why it is essential
that a control be included within a SIP ... [or] why a state's or a
locality's controls, when demonstrably effective, should not be
credited in determining whether a source subject to those controls
should be classified as a major or area source."'93
Inholding that state and local controls might be "effective" even
without federal enforceability, the court appeared to use the concept
of "effectiveness" in the purely technical sense, i.e., whether controls
are practicably enforceable. The opinion is problematic in that it does
not contain a refutation or even an acknowledgement of the EPA's
argument that federal enforceability is needed because controls might
be effective in a technical sense, and yet might not actually be
enforced as limitations on PTE in a practical sense.94
B. Challenge to Federal Enforceability of Controls on Potential to
Emit in the NSR 1989 Rules
The preamble to the June 28, 1989 Federal Register notice of
final rulemaking5 stated the basic reasoning the EPA had used in
deciding to retain federal enforceability of controls after the 1983
proposed rules had taken comments on the concept of abolishing the
requirement.96 Industry groups who opposed federal enforceability
in the NSR context challenged this rulemaking in CMA v. EPA.97
91. Id. at 1364.
92. Id. at 1363.
93. Id. at 1364.
94. The EPA's petition for rehearing to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals was denied on
September 21, 1995.
95. 54 Fed. Reg. 27274, 27274-84 (1989).
96. See supra text accompanying notes 37-40.
97. Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n. v. E.P.A., 70 F.3d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (consolidated cases Nos.
89-1514 to 89-1516)
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The EPA's brief in the CMA case did not present any new
arguments for federal enforceability. The main difference between it
and the National Mining brief was that the CMA brief devoted
considerably more space to reiteration of the June 1989 preamble
rationale. The CMA brief also included an explanation of why the
EPA felt it was beneficial to have more flexible enforcement options
under the CAA.
On September 15, 1995, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals issued
a summary opinion vacating the 1989 rulemaking. It did so, however,
with respect to the requirement that only federally enforceable
limitations would be considered in determining PTE to limit a
facility's emissions to minor source levels. 98
The CMA court did not analyze federal enforceability in the
particular context of construction permits for new or modified sources
in attainment or nonattainment areas. Rather, the court merely
noted:
We recently decided a similar challenge in National Mining Associa-
tion v. EPA, 59 F.3d 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Accordingly, it is
ordered and adjudged that the regulations are vacated and the case
is remanded to the Environmental Protection Agency in light of
National Mining Association."
A question left unanswered by the court's CMA decision is how
the court analyzed the 1989 preamble to the rule, in which the EPA
set forth a comprehensive rationale for federal enforceability in the
NSR context, a rationale which has been successfully applied in other
contexts."° By addressing the latter case (National Mining) first and
issuing a summary opinion in CMA, the court neglected to provide a
response to the EPA's rationale or guidance to the agency on how to
craft a future federal enforceability rule that would meet with the
court's approval. Working without guidance, the EPA must now
propose a rule, solicit and respond to public comment, promulgate a
final rule and await a future court's ruling on the validity of that rule.
98. Id.
99. ld.
100. An example of a use of this rationale can be found in the HAPs program, Title V.
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C. Congressional Challenges
Congress became an additional forum for the attack on federal
enforceability following the 1994 elections. The most vivid illustration
of this fact is the proposed thirty three percent cut to the EPA's
overall budget and the even more draconian fifty per cent cut to the
EPA's enforcement budget in the bill passed by the House, H.R.
2099."1 In justifying such a proposed massive reduction, the
Committee on Appropriations stated:
[T]he Agency is expected to eliminate dual jurisdiction problems
wherever possible and is directed to curtail the practice of over-
filing'10 on actions that have been previously filed by the States.
In this regard, the Agency is asked to report by June 30, 1996 on
the progress it has made in the reduction of dual jurisdictional
problems as well as on the number and reasons for any overfilings
it has undertaken during fiscal year 1996 .... 10'
This Congressional statement is a broad reference to federal
enforceability and clearly indicates the House's displeasure with the
EPA's practice of federal overfiling. Riders"°4 to the appropriations
bill also specifically prohibited the use of appropriated funds for
various activities, many of them enforcement-related."5
101. House Appropriations Committee Report on EPA Funding, Programs for Fiscal 1996
Issued July 17, 1995, Daily Environmental Report (BNA) No. 138, at D-40 (July 19, 1995)
(discussing cuts to federal agencies and stating that the House had passed a bill appropriating
EPA 4.89 billion dollars); Excerpts from Senate Appropriations Committee Report on VA, HUD,
and Independent Agencies Funding Bill (H.R. 2099) Dated September 13, 1995, Daily
Environmental Report (BNA) No. 180, at D-31 (September 18, 1995)(stating that the Senate
had appropriated the EPA 5.66 billion dollars).
102. An overfiling is the initiation of an enforcement action by the EPA after the state has
filed a state enforcement action. The EPA does not actually bring large numbers of overfilings
or original enforcement actions against sources that violate permit limits; more important is the
number of enforcement actions the EPA does not need to bring to have the sought-after impact.
The mere possibility of federal action being brought deters many sources from violating these
limits.
103. H.R. Rep. No. 201, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1995).
104. A rider is a clause, normally dealing with an unrelated matter, added to a bill during
its consideration. Riders are frequently added to appropriations bills.
105. E.g., one rider would limit the use of funds for development or enforcement of
operating permits under CAA sections 502(d)(2), 503(d)(3) and 502(I)(4), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7661a(d)(2),7661b(d)(3) and 7661(I)(4). H.R.Rep. No. 185, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (1995).
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The Regulatory Reform Bill,"°6 introduced by Senator Dole, is
a more subtle attack on federal enforceability. The primary thrust of
the bill was to restructure the rulemaking process so that risk analysis
would be performed on all rulemaking actions andopportunities for
judicial review of the analysis would be provided at each juncture.
The "look-back" provisions of the bill would deal with rulemakings
completed prior to enactment of the bill. Section 623 of the bill
would provide an exhaustive schedule for agencies to review existing
rules based on the risk analysis principles outlined in other parts of
the bill. In addition, the bill would establish the right of "any person"
to petition the federal government for review of "an interpretive rule,
a general statement of policy or guidance."1" The impact this
provision could have on federal enforceability is great, potentially
subjecting it to intensive administrative and judicial review, possibly
leading to the abolition of rules, policies and other guides issued over
several decades which define and clarify federal enforceability.
Several votes for closure of debate failed during the summer of 1995.
It is anticipated that the bill or a compromise version will appear in
the second session of the 104th Congress.
Several amendments to S. 343 would have had direct impact on
federal enforceability. On July 14, 1995, Senator Hutchinson intro-,
duced an amendment to S. 343 as section 709 of the bill."'8 Al-
though not abolishing federal enforceability, the amendment focused
on providing exceptions to the imposition of civil or criminal penalties
in the following situations:
(1) if the defendant, prior to commencement of the violation,
"reasonably in good faith determined, based upon a description,
explanation, or interpretation of the rule contained in the rule's
statement of basis and purpose, that the defendant was in compli-
ance with, exempt from, or otherwise not subject to, the require-
ments of the rule";0 9 or
(2) "reasonably relied" upon information provided by the agency
that promulgated the rule, or by the State authority with delegated
106. S. 343, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
107. S. 343, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(1) (1995).
108. Section 709 was adopted as an amendment toS. 343 by a vote of 80 to 0 on July 14,
1995. S. 343 was not passed by the Senate during the first session of the 104th Congress S. 343
may be introduced during the second session with or without the amendments.
109. Amendment No. 1795 "and Amendment No. 1487, 141 Cong. Rec. S10247 (daily ed.
July 18, 1995).
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authority, to the effect that "the defendant was in compliance with,
exempt from, or otherwise not subject to the rule.""0
A court would be prohibited from giving deference to subsequent
agency explanations of the rule under the amendment. Protracted
litigation and a shrinking of effective federal enforcement ability
would have been significant concerns if S. 343 had been enacted with
this amendment.
Senator Shelby and six co-sponsors submitted an additional
amendment, attached to amendment No. 1437 proposed by Senator
Dole, to S. 343.11I This second amendment, entitled "Small Busi-
ness Regulatory Bill of Rights," would provide the following "rights"
to "small" businesses (defined as those with less than 500 employees):
* protection of small businesses from enforcement actions if they
have voluntarily applied for a compliance audit;
a an abatement period of not less than sixty (60) days to allow
small businesses to correct any violations before a penalty is
assessed;
* freedom from inspections for 180 days after the small business
obtains certification from the agency that it was in compliance with
the regulation; and
* flexible payment plans for penalties with reduced installments
that reflect the business's long-term ability to pay.
The agency would also be required by this amendment to provide
implementation of a no-fault compliance audit program; a compliance
assistance program; and a uniform, consistent, and nonarbitrary
method to enforce regulations." 2
The proposal would severely limit penalties for noncompliance
by small businesses. Further, it would extend application of the
EPA's small business compliance incentives currently available to
businesses with 100 or fewer employees to businesses with 500 or
fewer employees. This extension would provide small business
protection from enforcement actions to approximately 4 million
"small" businesses.
110. Id.
111. Amendment No. 1551, 141 Cong. Rec. S10027 (daily ed. July 14, 1995). The "Small
Business Regulatory Bill of Rights" was adopted as an amendment to S.343 by a vote of 96 to
0 on July 10, 1995.
112. Amendment No. 1551, Subchapter VI, 141 Cong. Rec. S10014 (daily ed. July 14,1995).
1996]
DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM
Ill. PROPOSED OPTIONS
Because the time to seek a writ of certiorari to challenge the two
recent court decisions has passed," the agency must decide how to
revise two rules in response to the D.C. Circuit's decisions on federal
enforceability." 4 The EPA has articulated a rationale for federal
enforceability that has not specifically been attacked by the court.
The p6licy reasons articulated in the June 28, 1989 preamble to the
fital rule".5 on federal enforceability were not specifically briefed to
the National Mining court. While the rationale was included in the
CMA record, it was not addressed by the court in the court's
summary opinion. Thus, the court in CMA provided no guidance to
the agency in crafting a rule that would pass muster with the court.
A careful reading of the only decision that offers any guidance
on federal enforceability, National Mining, reveals that the court did
not abolish federally enforceable controls on potential to emit with
respect to HAPs. Rather, the court held that the agency had not
articulated reasons why other effective controls imposed by state or
local officials would not also conform with the statutory language that
potential to emit should be calculated "considering controls.""16
There are any number of options available to the EPA to adjust
federal. enforceability of controls on PTE in light of the recent case
decisions. These options should be presented to the public for
comments through a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) in
order to assess the prevailing attitudes toward these proposed
reforms.
One possible option the EPA has in responding to National
Mining and CMA that would retain federal enforceability is for the
EPA simply to propose revising its regulations and explain the
rationale for federal enforceability better than it was explained to the
D.C. Circuit. The proposal could indicate that federal enforceability
was-being retained as one pathway for assuring "effective" controls
and that states could submit proposed general controls to the EPA for
pre-approval. This option would retain federal enforceability as
113. Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n. v. E.P.A., 70 F,3d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (consolidated cases Nos.
89-1514 to 89-1516); National Mining Ass'n. v. E.P.A., 59 F.3d 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
114. 40 C.F.R. Pts. 60, 61 and 63 (HAPs general provisions); and 40 C.F.R. Pts. 51 and 52
(PSD/NSR rules).
115. 54 Fed. Reg. 27,274 (1989).
116.. National Mining, 59 F.3d at 1362.
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currently structured. A disadvantage of this approach is that it would
establish a new approval bureaucracy for determining "effective"
controls rather than relying on the SIP process. There is no guaran-
tee that the new bureaucracy would be superior to the old or that the
D.C. Circuit's concerns would be addressed by this method. Also,
industry would oppose this option because it would retain the federal
enforcement presence and would not streamline the permitting
process.
Another reform option would also retain federal enforceability
as one means of assuring "effective" controls. This option would
allow sources to choose between federal enforceability and state-only
controls. Sources who chose not to seek federally enforceable
controls would then need to seek case-by-case approval from the EPA
prior to installing the controls. Instead of general, statewide approval
of proposed state controls as in the first option, this option would
allow each individual control to be approved in its specific context.
This approach has several practical problems, the greatest being the
extraordinary resource commitment that would be required from the
EPA. From industry's perspective, rather than streamlining the
process, this option would lengthen the permitting process and be
more bureaucratic.
A third reform option would be for the EPA to retain federal
enforceability as an essential element of effective controls while
revising the administrative process for achieving federal enforceability.
For example, the agency could drop or revise the requirement for
public review of controls on emissions to reduce the PTE below major
source thresholds, could eliminate or reduce the public participation
process or could accept certification by a responsible official of the
source that the source accepts restrictions as reasonable. Such efforts
to reduce public participation and stream-line the process would
satisfy long-standing criticisms of the federal enforceability require-
ment. Such action would also be responsive to industry's concern that
the process of making requirements federally enforceable is too
lengthy. In addition, if coordinated properly, this option would
parallel a similar policy in the title V context."7 However, such
117. 60 Fed. Reg. 45,530,45,438 (August 31, 1995) ("States would have the flexibility to-vary
the process provided for the changes in this second category with the relative significance of the
change.... For changes that fall in these de minimis categories, the State may forego prior
public, affected State, or EPA review altogether.") (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 7.7(e)(ii) and
(f)(ii)) (proposed August 31, 1995) 60 Fed. Reg. 45,530, 45,567-45,568).
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reforms could have the adverse effect of diminishing the potential for
citizen enforcement. It is impossible for citizens to have access to
data about a source's potential to emit and the controls that have
been placed on that potential without receiving notice of the
permitting authority's action and being given an opportunity to
comment. In a time of diminishing enforcement resources for both
the EPA and state authorities, citizen enforcement becomes an
increasingly important element of the enforcement process. Addition-
ally, industry would not be completely satisfied with this option
because it does not address their primary concern of EPA overfiling.
Further, certification by a responsible official is a source's second-
hand way to achieve enforcement requirements.
As a final option, the EPA could retain federally enforceable'
controls that have gone through the SIP process or other required
approval while also agreeing to accept other controls imposed by
state and local air authorities with which the source is in compliance.
This approach would be responsive to the D.C. Circuit's concerns in
CMA and National Mining"8 while not abandoning the benefits of
federal enforceability that existed prior to the decisions. In its
NPRM, the EPA would also have to delineate the various require-
ments of "effective" state controls. These requirements could be:
state or source notice to the EPA that a source plans to use effective
state controls to limit its potential to emit to minor or area source
levels; descriptions of the amount and quality of information available
to the regulating authorities after permitting; procedures to ensure
that information to authorities is adequate and accurate; and the level
of public participation provided for in the process. In the past, the
EPA has provided guidance to sources and states on factors that it
considers to comprise an effective limit or control, including: a clear
statement as to the applicability; specificity as to the standard that
must be met; explicit statements of the compliance time frames (e.g.,
hourly, daily, monthly or 12 month); a statement that the time frames
will protect the standard; adequate record keeping requirements;
equivalent provisions to meet certain requirements; and timely notice
to the permitting authority. 9
These factors could be addressed as a part of this or any of the
other reform options proposed above and should be subject to
118. Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n. v. EPA, 70 F.3d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (consolidated cases Nos.
89-1514 to 89-1516); National Mining Ass'n. v. EPA, 59 F.3d 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
119. Stein, supra note 11, (memorandum at 5-11).
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comment within the proposed rulemaking. By analyzing the benefits
of retaining federal enforcement and the advantages and disadvantag-
es of each option, the public, regulated industry and environmentalists
could assist the agency in redrafting these rules to comport with the
D.C. Circuit's recent National Mining and CMA decisions.
CONCLUSION
Court challenges to federal enforceability of CAA provisions are
not new.1'2 The present rash of lawsuits aimed at specific aspects
of federal enforceability are not surprising given the political and
regulatory climate established by the 1994 election. As a result, the
EPA cannot ignore the court's decisions in National Mining and CMA
by refusing to alter its now disapproved concept of federal enforce-
ability of controls on potential to emit. Several reform options
suggested above are available to the EPA to respond to the court's
decisions in National Mining and CMA, and to also respond to all
interested parties' desire for input into the decision-making process on
federal enforceability. The reforms would also offer states and sources
some flexibility in attempting to avoid major source status while
retaining some of the desirable benefits of federal enforceability. The
agency should approach this rulemaking task cautiously, however,
being careful not to overreact to the National Mining and CMA
decisions, and thereby sacrificing the cornerstone upon which the
Clean Air Act is founded - achieving national air quality standards
through a uniform enforcement mechanism.
120. See, eg., Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Duquesne Light
Co. v. EPA, 698 F.2d 456 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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